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his true nature to us and teaches us the (occasionally hard) lessons we need
to learn as we travel the road to redemption.
For these reasons (and others), I find Wall's conception of hell uncompelling. But I am pleased to recommend his book nonetheless. For it is a
thoughtful discussion of a difficult topic, a valuable review of some important
arguments, and a genuine source of insight.
NOTES
1. I have set forth my reasons for believing this in "Punishment, Forgiveness, and Divine
Justice," Religious Studies. vol. 29 (June, 1993), pp. 151-68.

2. I defend this claim in an unpublished paper, "Three Pictures of God in Westem
Theology," Faith and Philosophy. Vol. 12 (1995), pp. 77-94.

Speaking of A Personal God: An Essay in Philosophical Theology, by Vincent
Brummer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp. ix and 160.
$44.95 (Cloth), $14.95 (Paper).

JOHN GRECO, Fordham University
The main thesis of Vincent Brummer's book is that philosophical theology
has an essential contribution to make to the theological quest of faith seeking
understanding. In the first two chapters of the book Brummer clarifies this
thesis and defends it against the objection that philosophical methodology is
inappropriate for the subject matter of theology. In the remaining chapters
Brummer attempts to illustrate the merits of philosophical theology via an
investigation of the conceptually thorny claim that human beings can be in
a personal relationship with God. In these chapters Brummer investigates
the Reformed doctrine of grace, the ability of God to do evil, the intelligibility
of double agency, and the possibility of a consoling and morally sensitive
theodicy. The book ends with an epilogue in which Brummer summarizes
his conclusions regarding the relationship between philosophy and theology.
The book is persuasively argued, and almost always a model of clarity.
Whether one is interested in the methodological or the substantive issues
treated here, Brummer's book will be found interesting and worthwhile.
As I have said Brummer treats a wide range of material, but in this review
I will restrict myself to two main issues. First, I will discuss Brummer's view
of the nature of philosophical theology and its relation to theological inquiry
in general, and I will try to resolve what might seem to be an inconsistency
in Brummer's view of what philosophical theology is. Second, I will briefly
summarize Brummer's conclusions regarding talk about a personal God, and
I will argue that Brummer's attempt to provide a morally sensitive theodicy
fails.
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The Nature and Role of Philosophical Theology
According to Brummer philosophy has been traditionally conceived as
providing epistemic justifications. On this conception philosophy in general
provides foundations, and philosophical theology provides foundations or
justifications for our religious beliefs. But such a conception puts philosophy
at odds with theology. The philosopher demands kinds of justifications that
cannot be given, and judges faith to be inappropriate as a result. On the other
hand, the theologian insists that it is the philosopher's demands that are
inappropriate, and judges philosophy irrelevant as a result. But philosophy
and theology need not be at odds, Brummer argues, for there is a way of
conceiving philosophy on which philosophy contributes to theology rather
than opposes it. Brummer has in mind the model of philosophy as conceptual
recollection, and argues that this model is to be found in the traditions of
Plato, Wittgenstein and Gadamer. More specifically, each of these thinkers
considers philosophy to be a kind of remembering what we already know.
And for each the purpose of such remembering is two-fold; philosophy has a
constructive use in supplying insight or knowledge, and it has a therapeutic use
in helping us to sort out conceptual dilemmas and mistakes in our thinking.
But in what sense does philosophy allow us to remember what we already
know? For all of these philosophers this is so in at least the metaphorical
sense that philosophical reflection makes known explicitly what was previously known only implicitly. Brummer uses an example to illustrate the
point. Native speakers can speak grammatically, and so in a sense they know
the rules that govern the grammar of their own language. Yet such speakers
need not have any explicit knowledge of these grammatical rules. But although such explicit knowledge is often lacking, having it can be helpful. For
example an explicit knowledge of grammar can help us to recognize mistakes,
and can help clarify what we should say in hard cases. And now similar
things can be said about the concepts we employ in language and thought.
Although we know how to use our language and employ its concepts, this is
very different from having an explicit knowledge of how our concepts work
and how they are related. Philosophical investigation is supposed to yield
such knowledge, and as a result it can be helpful in clarifying our thought
and resolving dilemmas and paradoxes which arise therein.
Whose concepts are the objects of philosophical rel1ection, and to what
extent is such reflection innovative and not merely descriptive? According
to Brummer, the philosopher does not analyze only her own concepts, but
possible conceptual forms as well. "Hence philosophical rel1ection is not
merely an exercise in recollection, but also, as Husserl tells us, an exercise
in imagination as well." (p. 19) Also, philosophical rel1ection is innovative
and not merely descriptive, aiming to produce conceptual forms which are
preferable to those we already employ.
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Brummer argues that when philosophy is understood as conceptual recollection, it is no longer at odds with theology but is rather an essential part of
it. "The task of philosophical theology is not to provide proofs of the truth
(or falsity) of the Christian faith. . .. Instead the philosophical theologian
asks semantic and hermeneutical questions about the meaning and interpretations of the faith: what are the implications and presuppositions of the
fundamental concepts of the faith, and how could the claims of the faith be
interpreted in a coherent and relevant way? In this sense philosophical
theology has an essential contribution to make in the theological quest of
faith seeking understanding." (p. 2)
More specifically, the role of philosophy in theology is to develop consistent and coherent conceptual forms, and to investigate the relationships of
these forms to other beliefs that we hold dear. Accordingly, Brummer places
philosophical theology at the first of three levels of theological inquiry. At
the first and most general level of reflection philosophical theology develops
and interprets conceptual forms and determines which conceptual forms can
be accepted without contradiction. The next level is confessional theology
or church dogmatics, which uses confessional criteria to determine which
conceptual forms can be accepted without becoming untrue to the community
of faith or the religious tradition. The third level of reflection is that of
personal faith. Here the individual must determine for herself which conceptual forms she can accept without losing her integrity.
It is not obvious how to interpret Brummer here, for there at least seems
to be a contradiction in the conception of philosophical theology presented
above. On the one hand Brummer says that philosophical theology operates
only at the most general level, trying to determine "which conceptual forms
can be accepted without contradiction" (p.2S), and that the philosophical
theologian "limits him-or herself to applying general logical criteria rather
than the criteria of a specific confessional community.... " (p.30) On the other
hand, there are places where Brummer says that philosophical theology includes
consideration of the commitments of confessional theology and personal faith.
"Hence the reflection practised by the philosophical theologian includes an inquiry ... into the conceptual grammar of specific views of life .... " (p. 30)
And " ... in the final analysis the philosophical theologian cannot be satisfied
with reflection on abstract conceptual possibilities, but must seek to understand those possibilities which he or she can make his or her own with
integrity. (p. 31) Thus Brummer seems to say that philosophical theology
does and does not consider the commitments of particular communities and
persons.
I think we can resolve the seeming contradiction if we make note of two
points. First, Brummer makes a distinction between analyzing the relations
among different commitments and affirming any of those commitments.
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Thus I can investigate what are the logical entailments of a set of assumptions
without accepting that the assumptions are true. If we keep this distinction
in mind, then we can see that philosophical theology involves the consideration of particular commitments in the first sense but not in the second.
Second, the distinction that Brummer is making between philosophical
theology and other levels of theological reflection is conceptual as opposed
to temporal. Thus it is not that we first do philosophical theology and then
at a later time move on to other levels of reflection. Rather, a person does
philosophical theology at the same time that she engages in the other levels
of theological reflection. Clarified in this way, Brummer's thesis is that the
general theological activity of faith seeking understanding involves philosophical theology as one of its essential dimensions, but not as a separate
step or in isolation from other forms of theological reflection.

Speaking of a Personal God
We may now turn to the second part of the book, where Brummer illustrates
the merits of philosophical theology by applying it to some specific theological problems. All of the problems arise from speaking of a personal God or,
more specifically, from affirming that humans can be involved in a personal
relationship with God. The idea here is that this way of thinking about our
relationship to God raises a variety of difficult conceptual problems. But
since the nature of these problems is conceptual, philosophical theology defined as conceptual analysis and innovation has an essential role to play in
resolving these problems.
To address the problem whether humans can resist the grace of God, Brummer distinguishes among conceptual, factual, normative and rational possibility. He then argues that such a conceptual framework allows us to give a
coherent formulation of the Reformed doctrine of grace. Next Brummer turns
to the question of whether God's freedom and omnipotence contradict the
doctrine of divine impeccability. Making use of some further modal analysis
and distinguishing free dispositions from necessitating causes, Brummer argues that for believers it is theologically necessary (de dicto) that Yahweh
cannot sin (de re) in the sense that He is perfectly and freely disposed this
way. Next Brummer tries to make sense of the doctrine of double agency, or
the claim that God acts through created persons. Here he develops a pragmatic conception of causation in which "X is the cause of Y' entails that, for
our purposes, X's occurring is an important and necessary part of the sufficient conditions for Y's occurring. In this way it makes sense to attribute
certain human actions to God, since we can say that God caused the action
in the sense of providing the most important of the necessary conditions for
the action's occurring. But we do not thereby deny human agency, since we
can consistently maintain that the free decision of the human agent is also a
necessary condition of the action's occurring.
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The final problem that Brummer considers is the possibility of a morally
sensitive and therefore consoling theodicy. Here the issue is whether
theodicies such as the free will defense must always be morally insensitive.
But Brummer seems to confuse two senses in which the free will defense
might be charged with insensitivity. First, the problem might be that expressing the free will defense is morally insensitive to those who suffer. "[AJrguments like the free will defense usually fail to offer any consolation to the
afflicted. On the contrary, such theodicy arguments are often experienced as
morally insensitive by those who suffer." (p.129-130) But second, the charge
might be that such a defense entails that God is morally insensitive, since
such a defense implies that God does not appropriately respond to the suffering of his people. "In fact, do arguments like the free will defence not conflict
with the claim that God is a God of love ... ?" (p. 130)
But whether the charge of moral insensitivity is directed at the theologian
or her God, it is not clear how Brummer's suggestions are supposed to solve
the problem being raised. His strategy is to show that the free will defense
is entailed by the fact that God is a God of love. The main idea is that entering
into a loving relationship entails making oneself vulnerable to the beloved,
and excludes forcing an affirmative response from the beloved. "In other
words, if God did not grant us the ability to sin and cause affliction to him
and to one another, we would not have the kind of frec and autonomous
existence necessary to enter into a relation of love with God and with one
another...." (p. 144)
Fair enough, but how is this supposed to help? If the issue is whether
expressions of the free will defense can be consoling to the afflicted, I do not
see that Brummer's suggestion is relevant. As Brummer recognizes himself,
whether a person is consolable will depend on factors external to the content
of the free will defense. Second, why think that expressions of the free will
defense should be consoling to the afflicted? Such a stance seems to misunderstand the purpose of the free will defense, confusing pastoral issues with
philosophical ones.
One might conclude that Brummer is really concerned with the second
version of the charge of moral insensitivity, i.e. that the free will defense
invokes a morally insensitive God. But Brummer's suggestions do not seem
to answer this version of the charge either. The objection that Brummer
thought compelling against Swinburne's version of the free will defense was
that freedom, responsibility and the goods that come with them are bought
at too high a price. Such things are valuable but not so valuable as to justify
the amount of pain and suffering that we find in the world. But there will be
an analogous response to Brummer's version of the free will defense.
Namely, the good of God's love does not justify the evil that comes with it
any more than the kinds of goods that Swinburne invokes.
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Brummer's response here is that being in a loving relationship with God is
not merely one good among others, but is the highest good for human beings.
Thus he advocates an Augustinian eudaimonism in which the promotion of
happiness is valued over the prevention of suffering. But here Brummer sets
up a false dilemma. God need not choose between the prevention of suffering
and the promotion of love, since both these values can be cultivated together.
The analogy to earthly parents is helpful here. Suppose that a mother
considers familial love to be the highest good for herself and her children.
For this reason she makes herself vulnerable in the ways required for the
possibility of such a relationship. But she ought not to do so at just any cost!
Suppose that one of her children persists in doing great harm to his siblings.
Surely there are cases where a mother ought to withdraw the vulnerability
required for a loving relationship, if only to protect her other children. My
point here in not that Brummer's theodicy must fail, or even that objections
along the above lines are ultimately valid. Rather, the point is that Brummer's
version of the free will defense does not represent an advance against the
charge of moral insensitivity. This is because, at least on that point, Brummer's version succeeds or fails to the same extent that Swinburne's does.*
*1 would like to thank Brian Leftow, Mark Massa and Merold Westphal for their comments.

